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Abstract
Evidence on the efficacy of preventive procedures in oral health care has not been matched by uptake of
prevention in clinical practice. Reducing oral disease in the population reduces the size of the future market for
treatment. Hence a provider’s intention to adopt prevention in clinical practice may be offset by the financial
implications of such behaviour. Effective prevention may therefore depend upon prevention-friendly methods of
remuneration if providers are to be rewarded appropriately for doing what the system expects them to do. This
paper considers whether changing the way providers are paid for delivering care can be expected to change the
utilisation of preventive care in the population in terms of the proportion of the population receiving preventive
care, the distribution of preventive care in the population and the pattern of preventive care received. A
conceptual framework is presented that identifies the determinants of rewards under different approaches to
provider remuneration. The framework is applied to develop recommendations for paying for prevention in clinical
practice. Literature on provider payment in dental care is reviewed to assess the evidence base for the effects of
changing payment methods, identify gaps in the evidence-base and inform the design of future research on
dental remuneration.
Background
Substantial evidence exists about the efficacy of preven-
tive procedures in oral health care. However data from
surveys of oral health in populations indicate that con-
siderable levels of oral disease, both untreated and trea-
ted, still occur [1,2] causing reductions in health-related
well-being of the individual, through pain, suffering and
reductions in function, while also adversely affecting
social and intellectual development of children, produc-
tivity among adults and the costs of treatment.
Investment in effective clinical prevention programmes
provides a potential evidence-based approach to improv-
ing the oral health of populations while avoiding the
social impact of oral disease. However the prevalence of
prevention in some populations is low, while in others
where prevalence of prevention is greater, the distribu-
tion of preventive care may not reflect the distribution
of needs for prevention in the population. This indicates
that although we may have information on what works
in prevention under study conditions (efficacy), this has
not been matched with evidence on what is required to
ensure that these preventive procedures reach the popu-
lations in need (effectiveness).
It may be that providers are unaware of the evidence
on prevention and, unlike the services they provide for
treatment of disease, they are unable to see the out-
comes of preventive services at the level of the indivi-
dual patient since they do not know when disease would
have occurred in the absence of prevention. This indi-
cates that effective dissemination programmes need to
be adopted (and evaluated) to ensure that providers
receive, understand, believe and intend to act on evi-
dence of effectiveness of prevention along with feedback
on the achievements of prevention among the provider’s
client population.
Even with effective dissemination, one potential bar-
rier to effective prevention is the way providers are
remunerated or rewarded for delivering care. Providers
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working under fee for service (FFS) payment methods
rely on a constant flow of patients with oral disease in
need of treatment in order to fulfil their workload (and
hence income) expectations [3]. Reducing oral disease in
the population reduces the size of the future market for
treatment. Hence a provider’s intention to act on evi-
dence of effectiveness may be offset by the financial
implications of turning the intention into practice. Effec-
tive prevention may therefore depend upon more pre-
vention-friendly methods of remuneration if providers
are to be rewarded appropriately for doing what the sys-
tem expects them to do.
The aim of this paper is to consider whether changing
the way providers are paid for delivering care can be
expected to change the utilisation of preventive care in
the population in terms of the proportion of the popula-
tion receiving preventive care, the distribution of pre-
ventive care in the population and the pattern of
preventive care received (timing and content).
Linking provider payments to system objectives
The goals and objectives of a health care system usually
reflect the social values of the population. For example
in the UK, the National Health Service was introduced
through legislation with the objective of ensuring that
“every man, woman and child can rely on getting … the
best medical and other facilities available and that their
getting them shall not depend on whether they can pay
for them or any other factor irrelevant to real need”, [4]
while in Canada the legislation that gave rise to the uni-
versal publicly-funded Medicare programme identified
the primary policy objective being “to protect, promote
and restore the physical and mental wellbeing of resi-
dents of Canada and to facilitate reasonable access to
health services without financial or other barriers”. [5]
An interesting feature of these policy objectives is the
identification of the health or health care needs of the
population as the central focus of policy as well as the
absence of mention of health care providers. Instead
health care provision is a means of pursuing the policy
objectives.
Health care providers act as both the suppliers of ser-
vices (aimed at protecting, promoting and restoring
health) as well being influential in determining the
demand for those services (through their recommenda-
tions to patients seeking changes in health status or
risks to health). As a result, the quantity, type and distri-
bution of services delivered in a population will be lar-
gely determined by the decisions of providers. But the
way dental care is organised, funded and delivered will
determine who attends for care. Hence efficient use of
resources depends not only on what is provided to
attending ‘patients’ but also who attends for care. The
well-established inverse-care law [6] indicates that those
at greatest risk of disease, and hence greatest need for
prevention, are often the same individuals who are least
likely to attend.
If resources are to be allocated efficiently (i.e., in ways
that make greatest impact on population health) the
incentives presented to health care providers need to be
closely aligned (or compatible) with the objectives of the
health care system. Yet historically, methods of provider
payment have often simply been inherited from periods
prior to the adoption of current policy objectives. For
example in Canada, FFS has remained the most predo-
minant form of physician payment for over a century
despite policy changes throughout the second half of the
20th century aimed at using health care resources in
accordance with ability to benefit, as opposed to ability
to pay (the economic condition for allocative efficiency)
and hence maximising expected health gain from what-
ever resources are committed to health care (the eco-
nomic condition for technical efficiency).
Methods of provider payment are ways of sending
messages to providers about how you want them to
behave. They generate rewards for provider behaviour
and, insofar as providers respond to these messages,
they determine the allocation of health care resources
(what services are produced) and the distribution of
health care services (who receives those services), and
hence the level of provider income.
It is important to note that choosing between methods
of payment is concerned only about how providers are
paid, not how much they are paid. Any income level is
compatible with any method of provider payment - the
methods only differ in what the provider has to do in
order to receive that level of income. In other words,
the choice of provider payment method is not about
reducing (or increasing for that matter) the average
income of providers, or the cost of the health care sys-
tem in which they work, although often policy discus-
sions have been based on such policy goals. Moreover,
individual providers have their own goals and aspira-
tions as well as constraints on their behaviour. As a
result different providers may respond differently to the
same payment method.
In some cases an individual provider may be paid ‘too
much’ from a system perspective in the sense that
increasing the rate of payment (per hour, or per service
or per client) may reduce the provider’s total output
(and conversely reducing the rate of payment would
lead to him/her providing more time/services/clients).
For example increasing the fee per service (or hour or
client) from $50 to $60 for a provider producing 200
services (or working 200 hours or serving 200 clients)
means that production can be reduced to 180 services
(or hours or clients) while increasing total income from
$10,000 to $10,800. Sometimes wage rates, fee levels or
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capitation rates may be increased in response to per-
ceived provider shortages only to find the problem gets
worse. This is because of conflicting ‘income’ and ‘sub-
stitution’ effects of changing payment rates (as the rate
of pay increases the provider can now take more leisure
without reducing his total income as much as before the
pay rate increase) and generates what in economics is
called the ‘backward bending supply curve’.
Theoretical models and conceptual frameworks can
provide the bases for generating incentive systems com-
patible with system objectives, but only careful empirical
analysis can determine whether providers (as individuals
or as a whole profession) respond to those incentives and
if so, whether the response is in the desired direction.
Conceptual framework
A conceptual framework for analysing provider payment
methods is presented in Table 1. This identifies three dis-
tinct payment methods, salary, fee for service and capita-
tion - with the important difference between the
methods being the basis on which provider payments are
calculated. Payment by outcomes (or results) is a fourth
method where payment is based on the levels of health
(or health gain) of clients. For example, the physician to
the Royal Court of Siam (Thailand) at the turn of the
20th century was paid a fixed fee for every day the mem-
bers of the royal family were well. [7] However payment
by outcomes is limited by ways of measuring the provi-
der’s contribution to health outcomes, i.e., health is pro-
duced by a range of different inputs only one of which is
the health care the individual receives. To implement
such an approach for an entire profession would there-
fore provide incentives to providers to serve those groups
in the population more likely to benefit from services.
Overcoming such patient selection incentives requires
methods for adjusting payment by outcomes for ‘patient
risks’ which essentially moves us back to capitation-type
principles.
Finally a mixture of the different approaches can be
used (often referred to as blended payments) producing
a more complex set of provider incentives.
Under each approach the actual level of payment can be
adjusted to reflect between-unit variations (i.e., hours,
service type and patient characteristics). So, time spent
in different activities can be set to reflect the intensity
or complexity of different activities, or different periods
of the day under salary-based systems; under FFS, fee
levels can be set to reflect the intensity, complexity or
time requirements of different services; under capitation,
fee levels can be set to reflect the expected needs for
care of different types of clients (e.g., elderly versus
young, male versus female etc).
An interesting feature of the three methods is that the
focus of overall health care policy, the populations being
served, is present only in capitation payments where a
provider is paid on the basis of the number of indivi-
duals for which he/she accepts responsibility for provid-
ing health care (and may include responsibility for
services provided by referral). Accordingly, total expen-
diture for any mean level of capitation fee is limited by
the total size (and characteristics) of the population.
Under salary payments, total expenditure is limited by
the total number of providers (which is independent of
the size and characteristics of the population) while
there is no such natural limit to expenditures for under
FFS - as long as more services can be delivered, total
expenditures can increase. Although expenditure caps or
‘clawbacks’ can be used to limit expenditures under FFS,
these introduce a separate set of incentives also unre-
lated to populations and their needs for care. Hence
capitation offers a clear advantage for managing total
health care expenditures. But what about the incentives
generated to providers?
Under salary there is no incentive to providing care
efficiently (i.e., prioritising clients with greatest needs,
delivering care in ways that allow more clients to be
cared for, and in ways that maximise the chances of
health gain). That does not mean providers will not work
efficiently under salary - but they will receive no addi-
tional reward for doing so compared with colleagues who
do not work efficiently.
Under FFS, there is also no reward for working effi-
ciently because the income received relates to the services
produced, no matter what types of clients receive the ser-
vices, or the quality of the services provided. At the
extreme, the provider could earn his/her income by seeing
only one client, but providing many services. Again, it
does not mean that providers will not deliver services effi-
ciently, but they will receive no additional reward for
doing so compared with colleagues who do not, for
Table 1. A conceptual framework for provider payment methods
Method Basis of payment Total expenditure Increase income
Salary Inputs (time) E = (E/T) × (T/P) × P Increase time
FFS Throughputs (services) E = (E/Q) × (Q/P) × P Increase services
Capitation Responsibility (clients) E = (E/N) × (N/P) × P Increase clients
E = Total Expenditure, P = number of providers, T = provider hours, Q = services provided, N = clients served, E/T = wage rate per hour, E/Q = average service
fee, E/N = average capitation fee
Birch BMC Oral Health 2015, 15(Suppl 1):S7
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6831/15/S1/S7
Page 3 of 7
example, deliver services based on the relative needs of cli-
ents. Moreover, delivering fewer services but of a higher
quality will be associated with a lower level of income.
Finally under capitation there is an incentive to deliver
care in ways that allow more clients to be cared for -
because this determines the provider’s income. However,
within any particular client load (patient population)
there is no incentive to deliver more services, or to
spend more time with each client because this reduces
the provider’s capacity to see more clients (and hence
boost his/her income).
This means we cannot expect one particular policy
tool (i.e., the chosen payment method) to serve as both
a rewards system for providers and a performance
appraisal system for funders. Instead, whatever method
of payment is to be used, careful management processes
and performance appraisal mechanisms will still be
required in order to ensure that provider behaviour is
compatible with system objectives. However, although
capitation does not provide rewards for delivering more
care (as distinct from taking on more clients) and, as a
result produces an incentive for what is often called
‘supervised neglect’ (i.e., accepting clients but not pro-
viding them with appropriate levels/types of care), the
risk to a provider of not providing appropriate care is
that a client may switch providers. Because payment is
related to number of clients, this presents a real threat
to the provider’s income level. This additional incentive
to satisfy clients is absent from the other methods sim-
ply because payments do not relate to client numbers/
types. Under salary payments, a dissatisfied client simply
reduces demands on the providers time without affect-
ing his/her income while under FFS dissatisfied clients
moving to different providers simply frees up provider
time to deliver more services or more frequent services
for other clients, hence replacing any lost income from
dissatisfied clients.
The incentive for patient satisfaction under capitation
will depend crucially on clients being able to change
providers and hence trigger the rewards system capita-
tion is meant to provide. If, for example, providers act
together to minimise client movements (by say closing
their patient rosters) clients will be deterred from leav-
ing a provider’s practice even where they are dissatisfied
because the opportunity to find another provider has
been restricted.
This conceptual framework indicates that under FFS
the incentive is to deliver more service whereas under
salary and capitation the incentives are to deliver fewer
services. Under capitation, unlike under salary, this
incentive is mitigated by the need to retain and attract
clients. Because effective prevention offers a potential
way of reducing service demands per client, and hence
increasing a provider’s capacity to serve more clients,
capitation payment in principle provides explicit rewards
for prevention not offered by the other payment meth-
ods. It pays to do whatever is expected to result in
fewer treatment needs.
The conceptual or theoretical issues associated with
different payment methods do not reflect the current
context of health care systems, the way service produc-
tion and delivery is organised and the way providers are
paid. It is therefore important to recognise the system
context - policy makers are not operating in a vacuum
(or from a blank piece of paper) but are concerned with
finding ways of changing aspects of the current system
in order to achieve changes in system outcomes. As a
result, we need to consider whether applying the con-
ceptual framework (i.e., changing provider payment
methods) to existing systems of care changes the bal-
ance between treatment and prevention and increases
the proportion of the population receiving evidence-
based dental care.
The effects of changing payment methods
The role of dental care in publicly-funded dental care
systems varies across jurisdictions. In some cases it is
largely excluded from the system (e.g., The Canada
Health Act is limited to services provided in hospitals
and services provided by physicians thus excluding most
dental care services and providers) while in others it
remains subject to the same principles as medical care
(e.g., UK National Health Service).
Even in systems where dental care is a formal part of
the publicly funded system, in many cases services are
delivered under contract by ‘private’ dentists with con-
tracts generally based on FFS arrangements. Moreover,
fiscally strained health care systems often look to increas-
ing user payments for dental care as ways of reducing the
costs of dental care to the health care system, further
reducing the difference between publicly funded and pri-
vately funded dental care.
The main areas where this is not the case are in Public
Dental Health clinics and services for the Armed Forces
where providers are employees and paid by salary. How-
ever these form a small proportion of total service deliv-
ery and are often limited to high risk or specific need
groups in populations who have problems accessing pri-
vate dentists. But because of the difference in payment
methods, as well as difference in the clients being served,
we might expect the effect of introducing capitation pay-
ments to depend, among other things, on the prevailing
form of payment and patient populations.
Brocklehurst et al. [8] performed a Cochrane (sys-
tematic) review of the effects of payment methods on
the behaviour of primary care dentists covering rando-
mised controlled trials (RCTs), non-randomised con-
trolled trials (NRCTs), controlled before-after (CBA)
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studies and interrupted time series (ITS) studies. Out of
4737 distinct articles identified, only 13 remained after
screening. Eight of these 13 articles were then excluded
because of inappropriate study designs (uncontrolled
before and after studies, inadequate number of time
points) leaving 5 articles based on two different studies
using experimental (RCT) designs.
The first study involved evaluating the effects of chan-
ging dentist payment from FFS to capitation for the deliv-
ery of dental care to children under the UK NHS. [9] The
study compared care provided to children by dentists for
whom payment changed from FFS to capitation fees (the
intervention group) with to care provided to children by
dentists who had no change in payment method (contin-
ued to be paid by FFS) (the control group). Dentists in
the intervention group were paid FFS for care required at
the start of the intervention to render each child dentally
fit before payment was then switched to capitation for
future care. The intervention lasted for three years.
The second study involved evaluating the effects of
changing payment from capitation to capitation plus tar-
geted FFS(i.e., blended payments) for specified preven-
tive procedures for the delivery of dental care to
children in Scotland under the UK NHS. [10] The study
compared care provided to children by dentists paid by
capitation, but in the case of one group, an additional
incentive of FFS payments for targeted preventive care
was introduced.
Changing from FFS to capitation
This study involved four paired comparisons of dental care
of children based on selected UK communities (rural,
urban, suburban and Scotland, which has markedly poorer
oral health than the other parts of the UK). [9] The mean
number of filled teeth per child and the mean percentage
of children having one or more teeth extracted were lower
among children living in communities served by dentists
paid capitation compared to children from communities
served by dentists paid FFS. However the mean percentage
of children receiving active preventive advice was higher in
communities served by dentists paid capitation. The pre-
valence of decayed teeth was higher in communities
served by dentists paid capitation but this difference was
only statistically significant in one of the pairs of commu-
nities. Brocklehurst et al. [8] report that “dentists working
under capitation arrangements restored carious teeth at a
later stage in the disease process than those working
under fee-for-service arrangements, but this delay did not
appear to compromise dental health.”. Although not all of
the paired comparisons were statistically significant, the
authors of the review noted that the unit of analysis (e.g.
dentists, patients) was often not the same as the unit of
randomisation (communities), leading to unit-of-analysis
error, while the baseline mean decayed/missing/filled
permanent teeth (DMFT) were unbalanced in two of
the four pairs, with the differences favouring the FFS
communities.
Changing from capitation to capitation plus targeted FFS
The mean percentage of 12-14 years olds receiving fis-
sure sealants on second permanent molars was 7.1%
higher among those served by dentists receiving the
additional FFS payment than among those served by
dentists who received only capitation. [10] This differ-
ence was not statistically significant. However after
adjusting for the deprivation category for the area of
practice, the number of partners in the practice, the
throughput of 11 to 13-year-old patients, and the num-
ber of restorative fissure sealants placed on first perma-
nent molars at baseline, the percentage difference in
children receiving the sealants between those served by
dentists with the FFS incentive and those served by
capitation-only dentists increased to 9.8% and was statis-
tically significant (p<0.05), albeit with a very wide 95%
confidence interval (1.8% to 17.8%). The authors of the
review noted that the study results need “to be inter-
preted in the context of a high risk of bias and indirect-
ness” and questioned the policy significance of an
intervention where a 1.8% improvement fell within the
range of statistical significance. [8]
One point not discussed in the review was the absence
of control on the total costs of paying dentists for caring
for the children. Dentists receiving additional FFS for
targeted services provided more care for which they
received more pay. However the study did not consider
how dentists would behave without the additional FFS
for targeted services but with enhanced capitation levels.
In other words the study involved comparing not only
different forms of remuneration but also different levels
of remuneration. As a result the findings cannot be
interpreted as evidence of the effects of the blended pay-
ment compared to capitation. The authors went on to
calculate a cost-effectiveness ratio which is only relevant
where total costs of the alternative options are different.
But they provide no rationale for considering only one
way of using these additional resources to improve pre-
ventive practice.
Non-experimental study designs - differences between
providers under different payment methods
Several other studies have analysed differences in service
use, mix, frequency and outcomes associated with differ-
ent provider payment methods using non experimental
designs. These studies represent a range of policy com-
parisons but are not designed in ways that inform policy
makers about the effect of changing payment method on
provider behaviour. For example Chalkley et al. [11]
found that treatment intensity was greater where dentists
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were paid capitation compared to dentists paid salary in
the UK NHS. However there were significant differences
in the types of patients being served by the two groups as
well as provider self selection into type of payment
method. Atchison and Schoen [12] found that in the US,
patients of dentists paid by FFS had more visits and ser-
vices than patients of dentists paid by capitation. Over-
treatment, occurred among dentists paid by FFS practices
and under-treatment occurred among dentists paid by
capitation where over and under treatment were mea-
sured by comparison of the prevalence of ‘complex’ treat-
ments with explicit guidelines for those treatments.
Grytten [13,14] compared behaviour of dentists under a
salary plus capitation blended payment method with
behaviour of dentists under a regular salary payment
method in Norway. Providers self selected into the
blended payment method. No differences were found in
the levels of prevention delivered, or under-diagnosis of
treatment needs and under-treatment of diagnosed con-
ditions. Providers under blended payment methods did
not select among patients but they did take responsibility
for more patients.
In the UK NHS provider payment arrangements chan-
ged in 2006 with a FFS system being replaced by three
‘course of treatment’ payment bands. As a result many
items of treatment that previously carried different fee
levels were now paid the same amount. An analysis of
trends in service items found that within a very short
period under the new payment arrangements the mix of
service types changed rapidly with services that require
less dentist time (e.g., extractions) ‘replacing’ services
that require more dentist time (e.g., restorations) [15].
Whittaker and Birch [16] found that the same change
in payment methods led to some dentists self selecting
‘out’ of the NHS (i.e., a reduction in total NHS supply)
and a redistribution of care provided under the NHS
away from clients with regular visits and towards ‘hard
to reach’ client populations. However the payment
change was accompanied with the adoption of ‘commis-
sioning’ of NHS dental care with local health trusts now
contracting for the delivery of NHS care. Methodologi-
cally these two policy changes cannot be separated.
Summary
There is limited evidence available on the effects of chan-
ging payment methods on provider behaviour. The recent
Cochrane review [8] found only two studies using experi-
mental designs to evaluate provider responses to change
in remuneration method. However even in these studies
the risk of bias was judged to have been high and the qual-
ity of the evidence generated, using the GRADE system
[17], was assessed as low or very low.
Notwithstanding the limitations on the volume and
quality of evidence, it appears that one common finding
from these studies is that providers do respond to finan-
cial incentives, although the nature of that response
encompasses a wide range of possibilities including the
selection of patients being cared for, the self-selection of
providers into preferred payment methods (including in
the case of the 2006 NHS reforms, providers withdraw-
ing from the publicly funded system) and the behaviour
of providers following change in payment methods.
Moreover the direction and quantity of change is diffi-
cult to predict. It may depend on the context in which
the change is occurring. For example, introducing capi-
tation as a method of provider payment may have a dif-
ferent effect on providers who were previously paid
salary to the effect it has on providers previously paid
by FFS. Even within groups of providers with the same
existing payment method we might expect variations in
the effects of changing payment methods among provi-
ders because they differ in their preferences for leisure
and income (and hence the value to them of trading off
one for the other) as well as the level and distribution of
needs in their patient populations.
Capitation payments support prevention and reward
providers for delivering preventive programmes by link-
ing provider income to the volume and type of clients for
whom the provider takes responsibility. Prevention
among high risk clients can be prioritised by setting capi-
tation fees in accordance with policy priorities in order to
reward providers for adopting strategies for outreach
among ‘hard to reach’ populations and retention of new
or irregular attending clients. Whether providers respond
to these incentives, and hence take advantage of the addi-
tional income opportunities, is an empirical matter which
is likely to depend on the design of the capitation system
(e.g., the levels of capitation fees, variation in those fees
by client type, provisions for supporting excessive and
unanticipated client needs etc).
Beyond these incentives for prevention, capitation has
deterrents to under-treatment where clients have the capa-
city to move between providers and provides a way of
managing the total cost of dental care by linking expendi-
tures to the needs of the population as opposed to the size
or characteristics of the provider workforce independent
of those needs. However patient satisfaction may not be
closely correlated with quality of care indicating that a
more informed patient population might be required in
order to effectively reduce incentives to ‘underserve’.
Based on the range of studies reviewed, capitation has
been associated with providers taking on more clients,
delivering more prevention among clients and delaying
the point of intervention in the disease processes.
Policy discussions aimed at introducing, promoting or
expanding prevention through, among other things, pro-
vider payment reform need to carefully evaluate the
response of providers to such reforms.
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